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Abstract
This Article discusses the latest episode in the history of one of the European Union. Part
I provides an overview of the integration project. Part II highlights the significance of debating
the future of Europe. Part III presents the vehicle of the European Convention. Part IV analyses
selected constitutionalizing themes offered in Monsieur Giscard’s blueprint. Finally, Part V offers
findings and perspectives.
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INTRODUCTION
When the Convention on the Future of Europe ("European
Convention") officially inaugurated its future-of-Europe deliber-
ations on February 28, 2002, at 3:00 pm in the Plenary Hall of
the European Parliament, a new chapter in the making of Eu-
rope was solemnly opened. Only eight months later, on October
28, 2002, the President of the European Convention, the former
Pr6sident de la R6publique Franaise, Val6ry Giscard d'Estaing,
affectionately known as "VGE" among the acronym-enamored
French, presented a preliminary draft of a constitutional treaty
proposing to push the European Union ("EU") toward the most
ambitious reorganization in its young history.' Despite the
rumblings about the initial activities of Monsieur Giscard, who,
in true allegiance to the maxim noblesse oblige - in his case, no-
bility by sword2 - fervently focused on salary matters and work-
* The views and the translations of foreign terminology offered in this Article are
strictly those of the author. All translations from foreign languages are done by the
author, unless otherwise mentioned. All foreign sources, including laws, court rulings,
papers, dissertations, and internet sources, are on file with the author, unless otherwise
noted. The Article expands on a faculty presentation made at the McGill University
Faculty of Law, Montreal, Canada on January 27, 2003. Since the original presentation
was made on the birthday of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, the author hopes that a
healthy dosage of Mozart Effect permeated the drafting stage of this Article.
** Markus G. Puder is a researcher and attorney in the Environmental Assessment
Division of Argonne National Laboratory, Washington, D.C. office. He is also an ad-
junct professor of law at the Georgetown University Law Center. His education in-
cludes: First and Second Legal State Examinations (Ludwig-Maximilans University, Mu-
nich, Germany), LL.M. (Georgetown University Law Center), and Ph.D. in Law (Lud-
wig-Maximilans University). Dr. Puder is currently a member of the New York State Bar
and the U.S. Supreme Court Bar.
1. Praesidium of The European Convention, Preliminary Draft Constitutional
Treaty, CONV 369/02 (Oct. 28, 2002) [hereinafter PDCT]. See also The European Con-
vention, Summary Report of the Plenary Session, CONV 378/02 (Oct. 31, 2002) [hereinafter
PDCT' Summary Report].
2. Herbert v. B6ckmann, Schwertadel, XLI Dt. Adelsblatt 391 (1923).
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ing conditions,3 the new body with the ominous label has sent a
resounding signal of political leadership.4
This Article discusses the latest episode in the history of one
of the most audacious experiments in governance ever launched
since the Philadelphia Convention that passed the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Part I provides an overview of the integration project. Part
II highlights the significance of debating the future of Europe.
Part III presents the vehicle of the European Convention. Part
IV analyses selected constitutionalizing themes offered in Mon-
sieur Giscard's blueprint. Finally, Part V offers findings and per-
spectives.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE INTEGRATION FRAMEWORK
The following description of the current framework of gov-
ernance subsumed under the roof of the EU is intended to es-
tablish the baseline for approaching the finality deliberations in
general, and Monsieur Giscard's blueprint in particular. The
overview presents the current integration architecture, the pro-
cess levers of integration, and the challenges associated with
molding the integration project into a chiseled notion.
A. Snapshot: The Three-Pillar Architecture of the European Union
The framework of the EU currently displays a Greek temple
built on three thematic pillars that correspond to different inte-
gration depths and governance modes.5 The First Pillar com-
prises the foundational European Communities: the European
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (col-
lectively "Community").' Within the Community dimension,
3. Bastian Bechtle, EU-Vfffassung-Chaotische Vorbereitungen ffir EU-Konvent, SPIEGEL
ONLINE 2002, available at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/europa/0,1518,178838,00.
html (reporting that Monsieur Giscard, prior to the actual startup of the European
Convention, sought to secure a net income of 20,000 Euro, establish a top-notch secre-
tariat staffed with fifteen to twenty elite diplomats, and book a five-star hotel suite in
Brussels for a one-year-and-a-half).
4. Annette Heuser, The Convention Scores a Partial Success, CAP Spotlight 2002/10
(2002).
5. The Three-Pillar structure was conceived by the Maastricht Treaty. Treaty on
European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (as amended)
[hereinafter TEU]. See, e.g., Markus G. Puder, Salade Nifoise from Amsterdam Left-Overs -
Does the Treaty of Nice Contain the Institutional Recipe to Ready the European Union for Enlarge-
ment?, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 53, 54 (2002); Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, The ABC of Community
Law 18 (2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/about/abc.html.
6. The two Foundational Communities were constructed by the two treaties of
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which covers the civilian nuclear sector and general economic
integration, autonomous institutions independent of the Mem-
ber States manage the government process.7 The lawmaking
prerogatives are allocated within the Community's institutional
triangle. The European Commission embodies the permanent
administration, in addition to exercising legislative and quasi-ju-
dicial functions.' The Council of Ministers, which consists of the
government delegates from the Member States, holds key legisla-
tive and appointment prerogatives.' The European Parliament
exercises legislative functions and political supervision."' While
directly elected by the Europeans, the membership of the body
is not proportional in accordance with the democratic principle
of population sizes, but is weighted in favor of the smaller coun-
tries.'' After the European Commission provides the initial
draft, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, in
more and more cases coequally, work out the final version. '2 De-
cision-making within the Community triangle is, in most cases,
no longer predicated upon unanimity. The judicial review in
the Community system falls to the European Court ofJustice and
the Court of First Instance."3 Budgetary control is provided by
the Court of Auditors.' 4 The Community approach of endowing
independent institutions with real sovereign powers that go be-
Rome. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (as amended) [hereinafter EEC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European
Atomic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 (as amended)[hereinafter
Euratom Treaty]. The TEU, supra n.5, redesignated the EEC Treaty into the Treaty
Establishing the European Community. Treaty Establishing the European Community,
Feb. 7, 1992, 0.J. 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (as amended) [hereinafter EC
Treaty]. The first integration framework, the Treaty of Paris, which had launched the
common management of the coal and steel sector, lapsed after fifty years in operation.
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140 (as amended) [hereinafter ECSC Treaty]. Coal and steel operations are
now covered tinder the EC Treaty. See generally Borchardt, supra n.5, at 18-20.
7. Puder, supra n.5, at 55, n.16.
8. EC Treaty, supra n.6, arts. 211-19; see also Borchardt, supra n.5, at 44-47.
9. EC Treaty, supra n.6, arts. 202-10; see also Borchardt, supra n.5, at 38-43.
10. EC Treaty, supra n.6, arts. 189-201; see also Borchardt, supra n.5, at 32-38.
11. EC Treaty, supra n.6, art. 190; see also Borchardt, supra n.5, at 34.
12. See Borchardt, supra n.5, at 72-84 (distinguishing among instruments of gen-
eral validity generated through consultation, cooperation, decision, approval, or imple-
mentation measures, and simplified-procedure instruments); see also Ptrder, supra n.5
(noting the two advisory institutions in lawmaking, namely, the Economic and Social
Committee, and the Committee of Regions).
13. EC Treaty, suprta n.6, arts. 220-45; see also Borchardt, supra n.5, at 44-52.
14. EC Treaty, supra n.6, arts. 246-48; see also Borchardt, supra n.5, at 53.
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yond the consensus-oriented mechanics prevailing in interna-
tional organizations has been touted as supranational.' 5 In con-
trast to the Community's method of governance, the intergov-
ernmental Second Pillar's Common Foreign and Security Policy
and the Third Pillar's Police and Judicial Cooperation in Crimi-
nal Matters are still basically controlled by the Member States
and the national veto.' The overall Three-Pillar construct func-
tions if the institutional triangle operates smoothly and liaises
effectively with the intergovernmental fora and players. These
include not only the European Council, the summit institution
of the EU bringing together the Heads of State or Government
and the President of the Commission,' v but also the Member
States proper. If, on the contrary, the triangle gets bogged down
or individual Member States proceed to slam the brakes, then
the whole integration system comes to a grinding halt.
B. Coordinate System: The Two Axes of Deepening and Widening
Projected against a time line, the integration process exhib-
its two axes: deepening and widening. Deepening refers not
only to the transfers of sovereign powers from the Member
States to the Community plane, but also involves moving fields
into progressive policy coordination under the Second and
Third Pillars of the EU.' Over the last five decades, the Mem-
ber States have amended the institutional, procedural, and sub-
stantive contents of the relevant treaties. Grand treaty revisions
are accomplished through a treaty-based process of international
conclusion and domestic ratification." Since the construction
of the Foundational Communities, four major revision thrusts
have occurred. 20 Despite ups and downs, the integration project
15. Hans-Peter Ispsen, Uber Supranationalitdt, in EUROPAISCHES GEMEINSCI-IAPr-
SRECHT IN EINZELSTUDIEN 97 (1984). But seeJean Monnet, M6moires 352 (1976) (sum-
marizing his reservations relative to the term through "mais ce mot ne meplaisait pas et m'a
jamais plu").
16. Puder, supra n.5, at 57.
17. TEU, supra n.5, art. 4; see aLso Borchardt, supra n.5, at 31.
18. Revisions are accomplished through a treaty-based, multi-phase process under
Article 48 of the TEU. The provision cotIples a series of steps in the international stage
with a domestic ratification requirement. TEU, supra n.5, art. 48.
19. For the legal requirements governing grand treaty revision, see TEU, supra n.5,
art. 48(l).
20. See Single European Act, 0J. L 169/1 (1987) [1987] 2 C.M.L.R 741 [hereinaf-
ter SEA]; TEU, supra n.5; Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on Etrropean
Union, the Treaties establishing the European CoImmnunities and certain related acts,
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has evolved from a trade zone to a single market with a common
currency. A Community bridge allows for folding the remainder
of the Justice and Home Affairs into the Community Pillar.2'
And, by name, a more pronounced European Security and De-
fense Policy has been launched.22 The political gravity field cre-
ated by the implementation of the euro, the persistent unem-
ployment plaguing the national economies, and the recurring
needs to avert against and respond to domestic crime and vio-
lence as well as external conflicts, will only accelerate the efforts
to achieve the envisaged European space of prosperity, safety,
security, and solidarity. 23
Widening refers to the spatial dimension of integration.24
In terms of territorial applicability of the treaty framework, the
integration club has grown from six to fifteen countries.
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Nether-
lands form the original six.25 Four rounds of enlargements have
added another nine: Denmark, Ireland, and the United King-
dom ("UK") in the first round; Greece in the second; Portugal
and Spain in the third; and Austria, Finland, and Sweden in the
fourth.2 ' As a result, the EU encompasses a geographic area
from Scandinavia in the North to the Mediterranean Basin in
the South, and from the Atlantic Ocean to the Heart of the Con-
Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]; Treaty of Nice
amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Com-
mnnities and certain related acts, Feb. 26, 2001, O.J. C 80/1 (2001).
2 I. TEU, supra n.5, art. 42. See Anke Gimbal, Die lnnev- undJustizpolitik der EU nach
Atruterdam, in AMSrERDAM IN DER ANALYSE 146 (1998). The transfer procedure is highly
complicated. While it has never been invoked, the existence of the bridge suggests that
at some point, the Third Pillar will be completely folded into the Community frame-
work. Id.
22. See Cologne European Council, Conclusions of the Presidesny (1999), available, at
http://eropa.eu.int/cotIncil/Off/conclu/. For the most recent developments, see Co-
penhagen European Council, Conclusions of the IPresidency 7-8 (2002), available at http://
europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/ [hereinafter Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions].
23. Werner Weidenfeld & Josef janning, Europas Zukunfsf ihigkeit - Heraus-
firderungen, Grundlagen, P1.e)ektiven 7-11 (CAP Working Paper, Dec. 2001).
24. The legal procedures and criteria for accession are contained in Article 49 of
the EU Treaty. It stipulates a network of international treaties between the incoming
countries and the extant Member States. Ratification must occur in all contracting
states. EU Treaty, art. 49. The legal requirements have regularly been supplemented
by political criteria. See Kairolina Ristva, The Legal Aspects of European Union En-
largement and the Balkan States 41-51 (unpti blished supervised elective research pro-
ject).25. DAVI A.O. EDWARI & RoBE I C. LANE, EUROI'AN COMMUNIY LAw 3-4 (1999).
26. Id. at 6, 13.
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tinent.27  In light of Europe's economic and political stability,
thirteen countries are vying for entry.2" With a large convoy of
ten countries - Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia - the
treaty of accession was signed on April 16, 2003.29 They are
slated for accession before the next elections to the European
Parliament in 2004. Two countries, Bulgaria and Romania, will
continue the accession negotiations .3 o They are expected to
enter in 2007.31 One country, Turkey, has not yet moved beyond
candidacy status. A decision relative to opening accession nego-
tiations will be taken in late 2004.32 Upon accession of all candi-
dates, the magnet EU is on track to boast twenty-eight member
countries, push its external borders to the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States and the Near East, and break new ethno-cul-
tural grounds. 3
C. Notional Elusiveness: The Futility of Classification Attempts
Despite the plethora of political and legal notions offered in
the literature and judicature to capture the construct some-
where in the continuum between regional international organi-
zation and federal State,-4 categorization attempts seem futile
27. Puder, supra n.5, at 59.
28. These thirteen countries are Turkey, Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Slovenia.
29. Informal European Councit: Athens Declartion (Apr. 16, 2003), availabe at http://
www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/4/16/2531/.
30. Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions, supra n.22, at 4.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 5.
33. See Josef Janning & Claus Giering, Strategien gegen die institutionele Erosion, in
DEMOKRATr UND INTERESSENAUSGLEICH 46-47, 70 (Claus Giering et al. eds., 1999) (list-
ing as additional potential entrants the European Free Trade Agreement countries of
Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland, the principalities of Andorra, Liechtenstein, Mon-
aco, and San Marino, the Western Balkan States of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia-
Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania, and based on historical and geographic consid-
erations, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine).
34. See Jan Mailler, Constitutionalism and the Founding of Constitutions: Carl Schmitt
and the Constitution of Europe, 21 CARDOZO L. Rhv. 1777, 1778 (2000) (adding a question
mark relative to the characterization by German constitutional scholars that the Euro-
pean Union ("EU") is "permanently suspended between Bundesstaat (federal [S]tate)
and Staatenbund (a federation of [S]tates)"). For terminology used to capture the inte-
gration framework, see, e.g., European Court of Justice, Case 294/83, Parti 4cologiste
"Les Verts" v. European Parliament, Case 294/83, [1986] E.C.R. 1339, 1365, para. 23
("Community based on the rule of law") [hereinafter Les Verts Case]; German Federal
Constitutional Court, Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92 Manfred Brunner and others v.
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because the multi-level network of European integration repre-
sents a moving and morphing target. Indeed, the most salient
characteristic of the EU system stems from the open-ended pro-
cess dynamics that continue to envelop and carry the integration
project and go beyond the customary political, socioeconomic,
and cultural changes experienced by any organization. 5 The
European edifice was not constituted with a big bang based on
one final foundational plan, but derives from incremental, care-
fully scoped progressions, and long consolidation periods."'
The integration treaties that mark stages on the road to achiev-
ing an ever-closer Union, 7 expressly embrace gradualism pursu-
ant to the Jean Monnet method" over constitutionalism, a
model track associated with Altiero Spinelli." 't In retrospect, this
method has thus far provided the recipe for success to resolve
conflicting interests, concepts, and goals among the Member
States, while not alienating the public at large to a degree of
paralysis.
D. Obsemvalions
Viewed over an extended period of time, the integration of
Europe has made great strides. Yet, the series of "mini bangs"
has also led to more complexity and less transparency within the
evolving framework that now comprises a panoply of treaties,
the European Union Treaty, BVerfCE 89, 156 (Maastricht Treaty) ("Saoatenverbindung,"
or linkage of States)); Wolfgang Merkel, Legtimiitfisiberlegungen zu einem unionsspezifis-
chen Demokratiemodell, in Demokratie und Interessenausgleich in der Europhischen
Union, supra n.33, at 27 (Claus Giering et al. eds., 1999) ("part-formed political sys-
tem"); Leon N. Lindberg & Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be-Polity - Patterns
of Change in the European Community (197(0) ("would-be polity"); Thomas Op-
permann, Die Europiische Getneinschafl als parstaatliche Supervtruktur, Skizze einer Realit/it-
sbeschreibung, in Fus'rscuFRvr FOR HANS PiER I'SEN 685 (1977) ("parastate superstruc-
ture"); Hans-Peter Ipsen, Europaisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (1970) ("framework sui
geneeris").
35. Forschungsinstitut der Dentschen Gesellschaft ffir Auswdirtige Politik, Weltpoli-
tik. net, EtLropoiische Union - Einfilhning, available at http://www.weltpolitik.net/sach
gebiete/eu [hereinafter Weltpolitik.net].
36. Id.
37. TEU, supra n.5, Pmbl., art. 1; EC Treaty, supra n.6, l'mbl.
38. Jean Monnet, A Ferment ofChangefe, 1J. COMMON MwiT. STUD. 203, 211 (1962); see
also Centro Italia Europea - Eurit, Gand-Place Europe, Jean Monnet - His Life and
Work, available at http://www.eurplace.oig/federal/monnet.thml [hereinafter Monnet,
Life and Work]. For an in-depth discussion of functionalism, see Renaud Dehousse,
Rediscovering Functionalism (jean Monnet Working Paper, Symposium, July 2000).
39. Monnet, Life and Work, supra n.38.
2003] CONS77TUTIONALIZING THE EUROPEAN UNION 1569
protocols, and declarations as well as numerous re- and over-
writes.
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF DEBATING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE
Since European integration has been achieved through suc-
cessive, open-ended construction phases, the deliberations on
the future of Europe add the proverbial light at the end of the
tunnel. Such discussions, albeit under different labels, are not a
new phenomenon throughout the history of the integration pro-
ject." At present, most actors and commentators employ the
phrase "finality debate" to shift the visor from gradualism to-
wards constitutionalism, or, in other words, to move into a pro-
cess of constitutionalization. Independent of terminology, the
discourse about the ultimate destination of the integration pro-
cess raises at least four significant, cross-cutting promises and
challenges for shaping the European integration process.
A. Break with the Conventional Templates of the Past
The very launch of these deliberations signals the intent to
dispense with the traditional process of intergovernmental con-
ferences, patchwork revisions, and lengthy consolidation phases
that seem outmoded for a growing and deepening Europe. In
terms of substance, the deliberating parties pledge to pursue the
answer to the question relative to what the Europeans are going
40. Since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951,
the reflections upon a European finality have been documented in numerous drafts
and reports authored by European institutions as well as national political parties, foun-
dations, and private citizens throughout the foundational, the reignition, and the ma-
turity periods of the integration project. They include, among others, the Draft Treaty
for a Statute of the European Community (Jean Monnet/Paul-Henri Spaak, 1953), the
Spinelli Draft (Altiero Spinelli, 1984), the work of the Confederation europ~enne
(Franqois Mitterand, 1990), the Hennann Report/Constitution of the European Union (Fer-
nand Hermann, 1994), and the Freedom in Responsibility Manifesto (Christian Demo-
cratic Union, 1994). While ultimately not implemented, these efforts proved, at least
partially, boosters in their own way. In 1957, the suite of the community treaties was
completed. In 1986, the SEA reinvigorated the idling integration engine. And in 1992,
the TEU conceived the Three-Pillar architecture of the EU. Forschungsinstitut der
Deutschen Gesellschaft fNr Auswirtige Politik, Weltpolitik.net, Zum Stand der Diskussion
um eine europadische Verfassung, available at http://www.weltpolitik.net/policy-forum/arti-
cle/252.html. See Sonja Volkmann-Schluck, Die Debatte um eine europdische Verfassung, in
LEITBIDER - KONZEPrE - S-rRA'EGIEN 12-16 (2001). In addition, the author identifies
three phases in the post-1999 constitutional debate: (1) from the beginnings of the
German Council Presidency to Joschka Fischer's Humboldt speech; (2) from Fischer's
speech to the Nice summit; and (3) the launch of the post-Nice process. Id. at 16-22.
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to build - something that one can see, smell, taste, hear, and
feel. In more concrete terms, the initiation of end games calls
for the insertion of the last brick into the integration project:
finalitgpolitique, or, full political integration.4'
B. Move from Permissive Consensus to Positive
Identification and Loyalty
Debating the future of Europe signals the intent of all play-
ers to counter the pervasive exhaustion of the permissive consen-
sus among the governed.42 The path towards finality requires
avoiding the errors of the past that led to major flash points of
crisis.4" Beyond the importance of lessons learned, a new cul-
ture of bright sunlight, public discussion, and full communica-
tion loops holds the promise of finally relinquishing the old reci-
pes of polity-building by stealth and elite bargaining that have
for so long dominated the integration project." Finally, this also
means that transparency and openness must be deemed as im-
portant as effectiveness and efficiency relative to forging a
stronger identification and loyalty within the envisioned frame-
work. Overall, this process of sparking a more general interest
among the peoples of Europe4 5 demands from discussants, at a
minimum, the active pursuit of togetherness."
C. Vet the Lingering Democracy and Legitimacy Questions
Finality involves a sincere attempt at conceptualizing for the
41. Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research at the Center for Applied Research
(University of Munich), Conceiving Europe's Reform, Discussion Paper jbr the Charlemagne
Forum on Europe in Aachen 24 (2002), available at http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de.
42. HEINZ LAUFER & THOMAS FISCHEIER, F6DERALISMUS ALS STRUKTURPRINZIP FOR DIE
EUROPAISCHE UNION 11, n.8 (1996) (offering numerous references relative to a reced-
ing tacit consent).
43. The various hours of truth found vivid expression in the adverse referenda in
Denmark on the TEU as well as the country's entry into the eurozone, the audible
stuttering of Franco-German engine, the undignified collapse of the Santer Commis-
sion, the initial plunge of the euro, the poor acceptance of the European Parliament,
and the overall bad image of Brussels. This diagnosis is further embodied in the deri-
sive slogans that were coined over the years, including "Monster of Maastricht," "dicta-
torship by the councils," "undemocratic super State," "faceless and soulless eurocracy,"
and "Nation-consuming Leviathan." Id. at 9-10.
44. Miller, supra n.34, at 1179.
45. TEU, supra n.5, art. 1.
46. See Bertelsman n Europa-Kom mission, Europas Vollendung vorbereiten -
Forderungen an die Ri'gerungskonfrrenz 2000, 27 (2000), available at http://www.cap.uni-
muenchen.de (using the term "das Europa der Birger," or, "the Europe of the Citizens").
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European integration order, the enabler of all governance or
constitutionalizer - ex nihilo or from the extant acquis. In this
realm of organizational theory and philosophy, Sieyos and
Schmitt have offered the couplet of pouvoir constituant and
pouvoir constitu, Spinoza has paired natura naturans with natura
naturata, and Kelsen has used the notion of the basic norm
(Grundnorm) .17 The notions hark back to the duality of constitu-
tion-giving and constitution-managing, and, transcended onto
the European plain, a convergence on resolving the alleged Eu-
ropean democracy and legitimacy deficits. Independent of
whether one construes the two as distinct or overlapping in
countless permutations, democracy and legitimacy are dynamic
and alive.48 They are ideal conditions requiring continuous ap-
proximation, yet seem forever incomplete and incapable of com-
pletion. Admittedly, the distillation of a common core with re-
spect to democracy and legitimacy faces the challenge of dispa-
rate cultures of public law and administration in Europe.49 The
nucleus of democracy is expressed as the congruence of the gov-
ernor and the governed." All bets remain open with respect to
translating this equation into the design of the European institu-
tional order, since finding the sovereign people residing prior to
and over, within, and next to the embodiment of governance,'
and construing the tractor beam between the will of the sover-
47. For an-indepth discussion and further references, see Andreas Kalyvas, Schmitt
and the Categories of the Political: Carl Schmitt and the Three Moments of Democracy, 21 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1525 (2000).
48. Miller, supra n.34, at 1778, n.3 ("democracy and legitimacy are not co-termi-
nous"); Merkel, supra n.34, at 28-31 (describing three dimensions of legitimacy: (1)
political community and demos; (2) democratic institutional order; and (3) efficiency);
Stephan Mazan, Das foderative Prinzip in der Europdischen Union, in 19 SCHRIFTEN ZUM
EUROPAREC-T 36-37 (1996) (using the following distinction within the overarching sub-
ject term of "legitimacy": (1) material legitimation that relates to safeguarding order
and peace, individual and social freedoms, and welfare; and (2) formal legitimation
that derives from democratic equality and rule of law); Gr.inne de Brca, The Quest for
Legitimacy in the European Union, 59 MOD. L. REV. 349 (1996) ("the power of the [S] tate
is legitimated through the democratic process").
49. Moller, supra n.34, at 1778 (observing that in Britain, sovereignty resides in the
Crown in Parliament, while France worships at the altar of the sovereign State, and
Germany defers to the Constitutional Court as the final arbiter).
50. See Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Nov. 19, 1865), in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-65, 536 (1989) ("government of the
people, by the people, for the people"); see also CARL SCHMIDT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE 228,
234 (1989) ("the identity between the dominant and the dominated, the ruler and the
ruled, the one who gives orders and the one who obeys them").
51. Kalyvas, supra n.47, at 1529-30 (the three moments of democracy).
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eign and the government, represent the central challenges. One
might intriguingly enquire about the significance of a difference
between people (demos) and peoples (demoi), and search for a
formula beyond the triangle of people-State-constitution. Peo-
ples plus Nation-States equals Europe could serve as a starting
point or working hypothesis. In addition, invoking the image of
a chain, the appropriate numbers and types of linkages between
the sovereign and the government will have to be weighed. This
relates to the criticism that the interposition of the Member
States and their executive branches within the current frame-
work has led to a pronounced executive tilt in the EU, also re-
ferred to as the democracy deficit.5"
While it has generally been accepted that the quest for legit-
imacy must go beyond Weber's triad of legal, traditional, and
charismatic authority, as well as the minimal standard of the
functionalist, success-based material self-legitimization, 3 the de-
bating parties will have to resolve whether the desired objective
involves nothing short of existential legitimization through a po-
litical constitution for Europe. Within the overall mix, answers
with respect to identity-forging and loyalty-building will have to
be offered. The finality debate promises to vet these existential
questions.
D. Enhance Europe's Posture in the Global Arena
The output feature of the integration order relates to its ef-
fectiveness and efficiency.54 The recent rifts within Europe over
the stances of Member States and candidate countries within in-
ternational organizations have painstakingly revealed rather un-
settling performance deficits. In this light, the future-of-Europe
deliberations must reignite the spirit that had prevailed in the
early 1990s when the implementation of a single market pro-
52. Hans Peter Ipsen, Zur Executiv-Rechtssetzung in der Europiischen Gemeinschaft, in
FESTSCHRIFT FOR PETER LERCHE 425 (1993); Koen Lenaerts, Some Reflections on the Separa-
tion of Powers in the European Community, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 11 (1991); Georg
Ress, Uber die Notwendigkeit parlamentarischer Legitimierung der Rechtssetzung der Europdis-
chen Gemeinschaften, in FESTSCHRIFr FUR WILHELM GECK 625 (1989). See also Dieter
Grimm, Does Europe Need a Constitution?, I EUR. L.J. 282, 291 (1995) (stating that "[t] he
difference lies in the reference back to the will of the Member States rather than to the
people").
53. MOiller, supra n.34, at 1778.
54. Volkmann-Schluck, supra n.40, at 10 (speaking of a legitimacy criterion); Welt-
politik.net, supra n.35 (diagnosing that output has dominated over input legitimation).
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gram was accelerated. The key borderless areas benefiting from
a major boost include trade, the environment, research and de-
velopment, and internal and external security.55 In the final
analysis, only a reinvigorated Europeanization will allow for
pooling resources, avoiding redundancies, and, above all, speak-
ing with one voice.
E. Observations
Within the finality debate, the constitutionalization theme is
omnipresent because it involves the very heart and fiber of build-
ing a European organism through a marriage of politics and the
law. The deliberations promise to spark the political process
and shape legal vehicles in pursuit of a genuinely accepted gov-
ernance framework. Conducting this discourse in sincerity re-
quires political statesmanship, legal imagination, and civic en-
gagement. This calls on politicians to be visionaries, inspirers,
and doers. Lawyers are challenged to seek new horizons beyond
the State-international organization dialectics. Most impor-
tantly, the citizen participant must not remain on the sidelines,
but should become vested in the discussions with the perspective
to provide actual input. The finality debate appeals to politics
and the law not just as science disciplines, but as high art in the
broadest sense.
1II. ANATOMY OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
The European Convention was created as a conduit for
shaping the constitutionalization theme triggered through the
finality debate. The novelty of the body warrants a closer look at
its genesis, membership, organization, procedure and working
methods, and schedule.
A. Genesis
The Nice Intergovernmental Conference, in Declaration
Number 23, launched the so-called post-Nice process, however,
it stopped short of charging a specific reform vehicle distinct
from the traditional grand revision template. 5" The Laeken Dec-
55. Weidenfeld &Janning, supra n.23, at 7-10.
56. Treaty of Nice, Declarations Adopted by the Conference, Declaration on the
Future of the European Union, 0.J. C 80/1, 85-86 (2001) (identifying four topical ar-
eas: (1) the division of powers between the EU and the Member States, including their
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laration, which on the substance formulated roughly 60 reform
questions, tasked a convention to broadly and openly "consider
the key issues for [Europe's] future development and . . .iden-
tify the various possible responses. '57 The composition of the
convention was to reflect the multi-level, interwoven, and
polycentric networks of public and private actors, institutions,
functions, jurisdictions, and resources currently subsumed
under the framework of the EU.
B. Membership
The membership of the European Convention features a
Symphony of a Hundred-And-Five: 5' a President (Valkrie Gis-
card d'Estaing), and two Vice Presidents (Giuliano Amato and
Jean-Luc Dehaene, the former Prime Ministers of Italy and
Belgium, respectively), twenty-eight government representatives
from the Member States and candidate countries (one each),
fifty-six delegates from the national parliaments of the Member
States and candidate countries (two each), sixteen Members of
the European Parliament, and two representatives from the Eu-
ropean Commission. In addition, the full members have one
alternate each."' Another thirteen observer-invitees represent
political subdivisions; (2) the role of the national parliaments in the integration pro-
cess; (3) the legal status of the Fundamental Rights Charter; and (4) the simplification
of the integration treaties); see also Puder, supra n.5, at 82-83.
57. Laeken European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency (2001) Annex 1, at 7,
available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/ (posing questions with respect
to four thematic blocs: (1) allocation and delineation of competences; (2) simplifica-
tion of instruments; (3) more democracy, transparency, and efficiency; and (4) path
toward a constitution); see also Claus Giering, Die Verfassung im Visier, Europdische Zeitung
01/2002, available at http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/aktuell/medien/2002/2002-
Ola.htm; Olaf Wittrock, Gipfel-Fazit: Europa vor der Revolution, available at http://www.
europa-digital.de/aktuell/dossier/nach 1109/nachlaek.shtml.
58. Ulrike Gurot, Aktueller Stand der Diskussion im europdischen Verfassungskonvent 3
(Gemeinsame Vortragsveranstaltung der Deutschen Gesellschaft far Auswirtige Politik
in Kooperation mit dem Zentrum ffir Europaische Integrationsforschung, Apr. 30,
2002) (emphasizing that 25% of the delegates are women). But seeJo SHAW, PROCESS,
RESPONSIBILITY AND INCLUSION IN EU CONS-ITITUTIONALISM - THE CHALLENGE FOR THE
CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF THE UNION 11 (2002) (diagnosing a paucity of women
and party imbalances).
59. For a visually appealing compilation of the organization and composition of
the European Convention, see Olaf Wittrock, Wer kommt in den Konvent?, available at
http://www.europa-digital.de/aktuell/dossier/konvent/konkand.shtml.
60. For the tables of members and alternates, see The European Convention, Com-
position, available at http://european-convention.eu.int/Static.asp?lang=en&Content=
composition.
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two advisory Community bodies - the Economic and Social
Committee (three) and the Committee of Regions (six), the so-
cial partners (three) and the European Ombudsman.6" Moreo-
ver, the European Convention Forum operates as a public partic-
ipation or stakeholder involvement venue folding civil society
and other interested individuals into the debate.6 2 Finally, in the
summer of 2002, a three-day European Youth Convention
brought together 210 young people between the ages of eigh-
teen and twenty-five years to discuss the future of Europe.6"
C. Organization
The European Convention features a twelve-member bu-
reau or Praesidium, which is to give the impetus to the proceed-
ings. 4 The autonomous General Secretariat of the European
Convention organizes the meetings and provides logistical sup-
port."' The overall budget stands at 10.5 million Euro.66
D. Procedure and Working Methods
The President and the two Vice Presidents hold a weekly
l9te-d-tele.67 The Praesidium meets every other week behind
closed doors on the premises of the European Parliament in
Brussels.6 8 A public Plenary Session is convened roughly every
61. Wvittrock, supra n.57.
62. The European Convention, Open Letter to the Editors of Newspapers in Mem-
ber States and Candidate Countries (Mar. 27, 2002); The European Convention, Intro-
duction to the Forum Website, availabe at http://europa.eu.int/futirum/forum-con-
vention/index_en.htm; see aL so Olaf Wittrock, Wie funktioniert der Konvent, available at
http://www.europa-digital.de/aktuell/dossier/konvent/arbeit.shtml.
63. See Welcome to the Youth Convention, available at http://www.youth-convention.
net/en/home.html.
64. The European Convention, Praesidium, available at http://european-conven-
tion.eu.int/praesidium.asp?lang=en (providing helpful background information, in-
cluding pertinent documents).
65. Wittrock, supra n.57. The European Convention's General Secretariat has
been established at the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers in Brussels. Sir
John Kerr is the Secretary General. See Shaw, supra n.58, at 1I (observing that, while
the membership of the highly influential Secretariat is diffused, the powerful deputy
Secretary General of the Council, Pierre de Boissieu, is said to have wielded considera-
ble influence with respect to certain (non-) appoinunents).
66. See SHAW, supra n.58, at 11.
67. Wittrock, supra n.57.
68. Id. For the chronologies and topics, see Das aktuelle Dossier, Die Plenardebat-
ten im EU-Verfassungskonvent, available at http://www.europa-digital.de/aktuell/dos-
sier/konvent/plensr.
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three weeks." ' All documents are available to the public."' The
speaking time has been limited to three minutes, creating a
sense of pragmatism.7 ' "Consensus-building" is the magic
buzzword for avoiding formal and contested vote counting.
72
Working Groups composed of members of the European Con-
vention were launched in June 2002 to explore topical themes
and issues more closely, and to generate detailed opinions.7"
Their number has increased from originally six to meanwhile
eleven." At the end of each Working Group meeting a sum-
mary is published. 75 Moreover, ten Working Groups have mean-
while published a final report.7" Numerous contributions and
written interventions by individual members, which are circu-
lated to all their colleagues, have been released into the public
domain.77 Finally, a first discussion circle, suggesting more free-
flowing deliberations, was launched.78
E. Schedules
The European Convention's proceedings, scheduled to run
from February 2002 through June 2003, are to unfold in three
stages: (1) a listening phase - ascertaining the expectations
and needs of the Member States, their governments and parlia-
69. Wittrock, supra n.57.
70. Id.
71. Matthias Zier, Revolution in der Warteschlleij, available at http://www.europa-dig-
ital.de/aktuell/dossier/konveit/zwibil .sh rml.
72. Wittrock, snpra n.57. See also Eric Philippart, The Convention on the uture of ihe
EU, No. I I CEPS Policy Brif 5 (2002).
73..See The Eur opean Convention, Proceedings, available at http://european-con-
vention.eu.int/travaux.asp?lang=en.
74. See Annette Heuser, S tructfure ofhe Conveniov Detromines Outcome - Organization
of the Working Groups, CAP Sri''rr r;Tii 2002/03 (2002) (recommending nine working
groups with chiseled objectives); Kristian Kampfer, Five Vefassungfiir Europa? Die deut-
schen A usga ugspositionen ind eine Zwischenbilanz des Koivents, available at h ttp://www.er-
ropa-digital.de/aktuell/dossier/ konven t/meyer.sh illI (summarizing a presentation at
the German Parliamentar) Society by Professor Jtirgen Meyer, the delegate firomn the
German Parliament).
75. The European Convention, Working Groups, available at http://eur opCan-col-
vention.eu.int/grptra v.asp?Iang=en.
76. The Etr'opean Convention, Working Groups: Introduction, supra n.73 (posting
the final reports).
77. The Eurropean Co nvention, Contibutions oI'Membrs of the Convention, available
(ii http://eropea-crionventioll.eul.int/dccregister.asp?laig=en&Coi tenit=CONTRI B.
78. The European Convention, Discussion Circles, available (it http://european-con-
ventioi.et.int/cloc_CiRCLE.asp?lang=eri. The first circle revolves around the Euro-
pean Court ofJ usticc.
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ments, and the European society; (2) a deliberating phase -
comparing and assessing the various opinions offered on the va-
rious reform topics; and (3) a proposing phase - synthesizing
and drafting proposals. 9
Following the third phase, the proposal is relayed to the in-
tergovernmental conference envisioned for the time frame be-
tween November 2003 and April 2004.8" In other words, this
process should be concluded well before the elections to the
next European Parliament in 2004. Others already foresee the
signature of a new Treaty of Rome at the occasion of the summit
concluding the Italian Council Presidency in December 2003.81
F. Observations
The Laeken formula for a convention was pushed by those
seeking stronger parliamentary and public participation compo-
nents. Moreover, it reflects a general fatigue with the traditional
summits and the hustle and bustle of the bazaar in the kasbah.82
The convention format differs from previous vehicles used in the
history of intergovernmental conferences." It is neither a gath-
ering of special representatives, delegates, and envoys converg-
ing in quasi-diplomatic privacy,84 nor a selection of wise men and
women deliberating aloofly, 5 nor a parliament engaging in con-
stitutional revision.8 6 Rather, the European Convention features
a group of men and women seeking "to propose a new frame-
79. The European Convention, Timetables of Meetings, available at http://european-
convention.eu.int. For an evaluation of the first phase, see Werner Weidenfeld, From
Listening to Consensus-Building - The Second Working Stage of the Convention, CAP SPOT-
LIGHT 2002/07 (2002) (welcoming the general direction provided by The European
Convention's initial round of consultations).
80. See Gu(6rot, supra n.58, at 9-10 (referring to discussions about the alternative of
a Europewide referendum on the basis of "one person, one vote").
81. See Olaf Wittrock, Der Konventionsfahrplan, available at http://www.europa-digi-
tal.de/aktuell/dossier/konvent/fahrplan.shtml.
82. The wee hours of Nice - grueling confession chair procedures, merciless
fights for food and thought papers, and endless haggling and almost incomprehensible
compromises - had caused lasting memories among negotiators and reporters. See
Puder, supra n.5, at 63, nn. 88-91.
83. Phillippart, supra n.72, at I (noting that Roman Herzog's convention that
drafted the Charter of Fundamental Rights was not directed to prepare an intergovern-
mental conference).
84. Id. For an example of this template, see Puder, supra n.5, at 62 (describing the
process that culminated with the Nice summit).
85. Phillippart, supra n.72, at I (emphasizing the personal capacity of this format).
86. Id. (explaining that this formula was used when the ad hoc Assembly (the pre-
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work and structures for the European Union, which are geared
to changes in the world situation, the needs of the citizens of
Europe and the future development of the European Union. 8 7
However, as the convention process has been maturing, it
has become clear that the Member States, not so eager to totally
hand away the reigns of control, have resorted to more subtle
means of influence. This diagnosis is reflected in the choice of a
troika of elder statesmen chairing the European Convention. 8
Moreover, the government delegates hold two thirds of the
Praesidium, while the fifty-six parliamentarians account for the
majority in the overall body.8" The preliminary rules of proce-
dure were heavily tilted towards the President with respect to de-
termining the agenda, the length of the debates, and the point
in time for sittings."0 On the other hand, the Praesidium has
had to back down on several occasions. 1 The working groups
were launched against the will of the Chair.9" In a similar vein,
the candidate States had to win their guest-participant status in
the Praesidium and the emancipation of their official lan-
guages." Finally, many view the lapse of time between the avail-
ability of the expected proposals and the decisive intergovern-
mental conference as a firewall allowing the ball to sit in the
court of the Member States for a while. 4
IV. MONSIEUR GISCARD'S BLUEPRINT
The Preliminary Draft Constitutional Treaty presents a first
cursor of the European Parliament) led the effort of drafting a Treaty for the European
Political Community).
87. Europa, European Commission, Audiovisual Libray, European Convention - Album,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/mediatheque/photo/select/conven tion3_en.
h tin.
88. Zier, supra n.71. For other considerations, see Kristian Kampfer, Die Zukunft
Europas in Joschka,5 Hdinden, available at http://www.europa-digital.de/aktuell/dossier/
konvent/haende.shtml (diagnosing thatJoschka Fischer's move to replace a university
professor reflects a power struggle between the Foreign Office and the Chancellor's
Office).
89. Zier, supra n.71.
90. Id.
91. Id. See also Martin Banks, Giscard Control over Convention Speaking Rights under
Attack, European Voice, available at http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/aktuell/
medien/2002/20020228.htnl.
92. Zier, supra n.71.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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pragmatic product marking the European Convention's entry
into the final proposing phase.95 After describing the layout, the
major reform themes central to a constitutionalization drive will
be analyzed.
A. Layout
1. Designation
While the subject line of the cover note from the
Praesidium to the Convention reads Preliminary Draft Constitu-
tional Treaty,96 the attached body of the document titles Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe.9 7 One might argue that
"Constitutional Treaty" emphasizes the continued anchoring of
the integration project in the international law basis,98 whereas
"Constitution for Europe" intimates finality through a constitu-
tional leap.9" The designations Basic Treaty, merely bundling
provisions, 1.... Constitutional Charter, invoking the judgments of
the European Court ofJustice,"" I or Constitutional Pact, connot-
95. Monsieur Giscard celebrated the occasion by removing the document from a
sealed envelope after having arranged for a personal distribution only at the very begin-
ning of the session. In the Praesidium, he even had the text collected again at the end
of the sitting. See Arne Schneider, Wegmnarkefiir ein neues Europa, available at http://www.
europa-digital.de/aktuell/dossier/konvent/fahrplan.shtml. The proposing phase has
been characterized by the rise of numerous constitutional drafts offered by players in-
side and outside of The European Convention. See CAP, EU-Reform, EU-Konvent,
Verfasungsentwfirfe, available at http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/konvent/entwuerfe.
htm. For a Juxtaposition of the two main parliamentarian constitutional drafts au-
thored by the Brok Group (European People's Parties) and Andrew Duff (Liberals), see
Claus Giering, Different Ways - One Target - Convention Members Present First Draft Consti-
tutions, CAP SPOTLIGHT 2002/08 (2002) (providing a summary side-by-side in table for-
mat). A rather copious working document was prepared under the aegis of the Euro-
pean Commission at the request of President Romani Prodi. See FRANCOIS LAMOUREUX
ET AL., FExuSIrLry STUDY, CONTRIBUTION TO A PRELIMINARY DRAr- CONsTITUTION OF
TIE EUROPEAN UNION (2002) (offering a comprehensive introductory narrative as well
as a proposed document).
96. PDCT, supra n.1, at 1.
97. Id. at 4.
98. Volkmann-Schluck, supra n.40, at 31. See also Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace:
A Philosophical Sketch (1795) (predicting that states will contractually bind themselves
together, like private individuals within the State, which will give rise to a republic of
the republics and overcome the state of war of the lawless space).
99. Heuser, supra n.4; Kampfer, supra n.74.
100. Volkmann-Schltck, supra n.40 , at 31. For an example of such a consolidated
treaty, see Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research, A Basic Treaty for the European
Union - Draft Version for the Reorganization of the Treaties (2000).
101. Les Verts Case, [1986] E.C.R. at 1365. See alsoJ.J. Zwartveld and Others, Case
C-2/88, [1990] E.C.R. 3365, 3372; Opinion 1/76 of 28 April 1977, [1977] E.C.R. 758,
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ing the usage by the European Movement,112 are not offered.
2. Architecture
In pursuit of treaty simplification, the eighteen-page draft
presents a single consolidated document designed to supplant
the extant panoply of treaties and protocols."' It exhibits a tri-
furcation into a constitutional structure reflecting the conven-
tion proposals, an administrative part folding in the policy and
action clauses from the existing treaties, and a final part offering
general provisions." 4 Once finalized, the constitutional text will
boast more than 400 provisions. 11
3. Drafting Method
In light of its outline format, the document has already
come to be known as the skeleton.""' The constitutional part
features ten title headings with a total of forty-six articles." 7 The
contents of each provision are a function of the consensus
method and the desire to achieve a blueprint rather than a mere
batch of options." 8 Emphasis was placed on clarity and readabil-
ity.""'i In general, more flesh on the bones reflects a stronger
sense of consensus.'"' Rudimentary language signals emerging
trends, offers choices, or identifies issue areas for further discus-
para. 12; Beate Weber v. European Parliament, Case C-314/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1093
(para. 8). See alo Udo di Fabio, A European Charter: Towards a Constitution jbr the Union,
7 Cotum. j. EUR. L. 159, 165 (using the term Charter to describe the Constitution of an
association of States).
102. Jean-Claude Piris, Does the European Union Have a Constitution? Does It Need
One? (Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper, May 2000), available (it http://wxv.jean
inon netprog,-aim.org/palers/00/000501 ihtml.
103. PDCT Summay Report, sunra n. 1, at 2.
104. See PDCT, supra n. 1, at 2-7; PDCTSumman, Reporl, supra n. 1, at 1-2.
105. Heuser, supra n.4, at 2. Clans Giering, Be/vihrungsproben anf den Weg zur
Verassung, Europaische Zeitung 2 (Nov. 2022), available at http://www.cap.uni-
moenichen.de/aktoell/medicn/2002/2002_l la.htn.
106. See Ian Black, Giscard Unveils DIaft ]or "United Europe", GUARDIAN UNA.siMTE),
Oct. 29, 2002; Kristian Kampfer, Die Zehote Plenartagung: Vorentwof einer Verfnssung, die
Rolle einzelstaatlicher Padamente und Charta der Grundrechte, available at http:/ /www.eu-
ropa-digital.de/aktuell/dossier/krnvent/ plenar/ptl 0.shtml.
107. See Black, supra n.106.
108. See Phillippart, supra n.72, at I (advocating "precise recommendations, and
not a catalogtue of options").
109. See PDCT Summary Report, supra n. 1, at 13 (describing the positive reactions
among the members during preliminary debate).
110. Id. at 3.
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sions. "' The elastic styling of the provisions is intended to allow
the Praesidium to successively complete building blocs and pre-
sent full-fledged draft sections and articles, and thus attain its
goal of constructing a whole final draft constitutional treaty
before the European Convention adjourns sine die.' 12
B. Reform Themes
The principal constitutionalizing reforms thematized in
Monsieur Giscard's skeleton include the nature and foundations
of Europe, the protection of fundamental rights, the allocation
of the competences, and the institutional government. Moreo-
ver, other important topics are materializing on the horizon.
1. Nature and Foundations of Europe
The assortment of choices floated in Monsieur Giscard's
blueprint relative to the official title of the integration frame-
work, signals the intent to articulate a hiatus ushering in a practi-
cal re-foundation and solemn re-endowment of Europe.1"' Iden-
tifying potential guiding visions (Leitbilder) sets the stage for
resolving the logical question that must precede any drive to-
wards a constitution, namely, what it is that shall be consti-
tuted. ' 14
The term "European Community" connects to the begin-
nings of European integration and the image of a Europe gov-
erned by a Table of Prime Ministers and run by an economic
government that conducts the political management of the euro
in counterbalance to the European Central Bank." 5 The title
"European Union" reflects the present structure built around
111. See id. For example, the proposal reflects a stronger consensus anong the
members on values and legal personality, whereas the language relative to the catego-
ries of competences and the injection of suspension and withdrawal procedures repre-
sents a first tendency. Choices are floated with respect to the designation of the inte-
gration framework and the road to fundamental rights. The installation of Presidencies
for the European Council and Commission, and the modalities for the entry into force
warrant further disctussions.
112. Id.
113. PDCT, supra n.i, art. 1.
114. See Volkmann-Schluck, supra n.40, at 23 (quoting the former Governor of
Saxonia, Kurt Biedenkopf).
. 115. See Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research at the Center for Applied Re-
search, supra n.41, at 4 (describing this scenario as a "deepened trade zone" with room
for enhanced cooperation among the eurozone countries); Volkmann-Schluck, supra
n.40, at 28 (encapsulating the British ideal of Europe as an economic power station).
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the Community core and the open status quo.'' The vision of
the United States as an example for Europe has inspired much
euphoria over the past centuries.'" However, in the words of
the history major and former Chancellor of Germany Helmut
Kohl, who stopped invoking the reference in the early 1990s:
"the formula ... leads to error, because anybody who hears this
formula immediately thinks . . .of the United States."'"18 The
notion of a United Europe, which is favored by Monsieur Gis-
card, is less fraught with pre-established connotations.' '
The following articles in Monsieur Giscard's blueprint offer
more direction. They envision the future Europe as a Union of
European States organized on a federal basis,'2 " and equipped
with legal personality.' 2' This sounds reminiscent of Joschka
Fischer's speech that had ricocheted throughout Europe in the
spring of 2000." '  The German Foreign Minister is now Ger-
116. See Volkmann-Schluck, supra n.40, at 27 (identifying the Commission, the Eu-
ropean Parliament, and the smaller Member States as proponents of this vision); see
also Heuser, supra n.4, at 3 (emphasizing that the current name has not only created an
identity for the fifteen Member States, but also "elicited a positive integrational dyna-
mism in the accession states").
117. For an overview of the history of the European unity movement, see WOLF-
GANG W. MICKEL., ed., Handlexikon der EUropiischen Union XIII-X Ll (1998) (describ-
ing, inter (lia, the Pan-Europa Union founded by the Austrian Count Coudenhove-
Kalergi).
118. For the full 1993 quote in German, see LAUFER & FISCHER, supra n.42, at 22.
See also Mazan, supra n.48, at 76 ("no realistic scenario"); Freedom in Responsibility
Manifesto, supra n.40 ("des notions telles que... 'Etats-Unis d'Europe' ne sont pas de
nature A rendre manifeste le caractire original de la construction juridique
europtenne."); Mark C. Anderson, A Tougher Row to Hoe: The European Union s Ascension
as a Global Superpower Analyzed through the Anerican Federal Experience, 29 SYRACUSFJ. INT'L
L. & CoM. 83, 90-117 (2001) (discussing the presence of themes that led to the rise of
the United States of America, while the absence of corresponding features poses obsta-
cles to the European Union's transformation: (1) the common enemy; (2) only as
strong as its weakest link; (3) blank slate; (4) e plutibus unun; (5) manifest destiny; (6)
democracy deficit; (7) common defense; and (8) World War II effect).
119. Black, supra n.106.
120. PDCT, supra n.I, art. 1 ("A Union of European States which, while retaining
their national identities, closely coordinate their policies at the European level, and
administer certain competences on a federal basis").
121. PDCT, supra n.1, art. 4 ("Explicit recognition of legal personality of the [Euro-
pean Community/Union, United States of Europe, United Europe]").
122. JoscilKA FISci-iER, VOM STAATENIUND ZUR FODFRATION - GEDANKEN OBER DIE
FINALITAT DER EUROPAISCIIEN INTEGRATION (2000). For the English language version, see
JOSCHiKA FISCHER, FROM CONFEDERxcy TO FEIERAC, - TiOUGHITS ON THE FINALI'Y OF
EUROI'EAN INTEGRATION (2000). See generally Volkmann-Schluck, supra n.40, at 18-21
(providing contexts and reactions).
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many's high-profile delegate to the European Convention.
2 3
The resurrection of federalism, the infamous F-Word which had
been exiled in the course of the Maastricht debate, as an or-
ganizing principle in the finality deliberations seems stunning. 121
The Germans construe federalism as a lever for devolution,
whereas the British connect with federalism the rise of a Super-
state. 12 Since the two schools have stubbornly proved unbridge-
able, the word "federalism" had never entered the treaty system.
At present, the European Communities, as opposed to the
EU, are endowed with legal personality.'26 The conferment of
unitary legal personality makes Europe an actor and notary-pub-
lic on the international scene, signals treaty and pillar consolida-
tion, and spurs greater transparency and identity-building. 1
27
2. Protection of Fundamental Rights
At the time of the Nice Intergovernmental Conference, a
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU was drafted. 28 The
UK has balked at equipping the document with legal force.
129
The British generally oppose the addition of new social rights
beyond the already extant European Convention on Human
Rights. l'3 However, Monsieur Giscard's blueprint considers it
essential that fundamental rights be enshrined in the future con-
stitutional treaty.'' A Union-based avenue'3 2 and a route
123. Kampfer, suna n.88.
124. The term "federal" was dropped during the negotiations to avoid placing into
jeopardy the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty. See LAUFER & FISCHER, supra
n.42, at 12, 18-25 (offering further references).
125. See, e.g., Volkmann-Schluck, supra n.40, at 27; Ludger Kfihnhardt, Towards
Europe 2007 - Identity, Institution-Building and the Constitution of Europe 10 (2001);
LAUFER & FISCHER, supra n.42, at 19.
126. EC Treaty, supra n.6, art. 281; Euratom Treaty, supra n.6, art. 184. See also
Matthias Pechstein & Christian Koenig, Rechtspersdnlichkeit fir die Europdische Union? in
Europaische Zeitschrift ir Wirtschaftsrecht 225 (1997) (explaining that the EU exists
through the coordinated, unified appearance of the European Communities as well as
the Member States in joint leverage of their respective competences).
127. Chairman of Working Group III on Legal Personality, Final Report, CONV
305/02 (Oct. 1, 2002).
128. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. C 346/1 (2000).
129. "The Charter is simply a statement of policy and the United Kingdom is not
the only Member State to oppose something of a binding legal nature." Tony Blair,
British Prime Minister, Nov. 14, 2000, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice-
home/unit/charte/en/charter03.html.
130. Europe's New Shape, ECONOMis-r, Dec. 14, 2001, available at http://www.global
policy.org/globaliz/politics/ 1214europe.htm.
131. PDCT, supra n.1, art. 6. See also PDCT Summaiy Report, supra n.6, at 7-12;
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through the European Convention on Human Rights
("ECHR") ... are conceivable as complements or alternatives."'
The blueprint sketches out three options under the Union-
based avenue: 115 first, an indirect reference to the Charter that
stands alone, binding yet sub-constitutional;"m second, a straight
reference in the Constitutional Part to another part of the treaty
or an annexed protocol;' 7 or third, a full incorporation in the
Constitutional Part."," Under any of the three options, the Char-
ter content would not change, the allocation of competences be-
tween Europe and the Nation-States would remain unaltered,
and the national courts would be competent to hear appeals. 3
9
The Charter Working Group has also been broaching the ques-
tion of enabling the Union to accede to the ECHR.' 41 Similar to
the Union-based route, no new competences for the EU would
arise, since the accession would concern only extant fields of EU
law. '4 Overall, both avenues promise to enhance the protection
of citizens' rights, leave intact the balance of responsibilities, and
forcefully assert ethical and moral values within the integration
system. 142
Chairman of Working Group I1, Incorporation of the Charter/Accession to the ECHR,
Fival Report, CONV 354/02 (Oct. 22, 2002) [herei nafter 2002 Working Group 11 Final
Report].
132. PDCT, supra n.1, art. 6, para. I ("The wording of this article will depend on
the proceedings of the Working Group of the Charter").
133. Id. art. 6, para 2 ("It could be modeled on Article 6 of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union").
134. Many members have articulated their support for considering the incorpora-
tion and accession routes as complimentary initiatives. ,See PI)CI' SummaUy Report, supra
n. I, at 9; 2002 Working Group 11, Firal Report, supra n. 131, at 12. A smaller group has
expressed reservations relative to the ECHR route. See PDCT Summay Report, supra n.],
at I.
135. PDCT supra I.l, art. 6, para. 3.
136. Id. ("either refer to the Charter").
137. Id. ("or state the principle that the Charter is an integral part of the Constitu-
tion, with the articles of the Charter being set out in another part of the Treaty or in an
annexed protocol").
138. Id. ("or incorporate all the articles of the Charter").
139. 2002 Working Group II, Final Report, supra n.131, at 4-8.
140. Id. at 11-15.
141. Id. at 13-15.
142. The European Convention, Fundamental Rights: An Integral Part oj the Future
Constitutional Treaty, Points No. 4. For discussions on access to the Court of justice, see
2002 Working Group II, Final Report, supra n.131, at 15-16.
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3. Allocation of Competences
In absence of a Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the powers transferred
by the Member States into the Community core are of attribu-
tion. "' However, the unsystematized, elastic, and pragmatic
handling relative to the seat of a particular action competence,
explicit or implied, through formulation of objectives and judi-
cial resolution, was preferred by the treaty framers over a com-
prehensive and chiseled catalogue. While the former did allow a
novel order of governance to move forward, this no longer nec-
essarily rings true for a system that has matured. The blueprint
proposes a separate title relative to the allocation of compe-
tences.' 44  It carves out three tiers of powers - exclusive,
4 5
shared, 4 " and supporting' 47 - scaled along the level of Euro-
pean control and linked up with specific policy spheres of ac-
tion.'4X Exclusive competences are Europe's very own, including
the customs union, the internal market, and the currency
union."" 'U Shared powers, exercised in common, involve treaty-
essential fields with cross-border elements like the four free-
doms, the protection of the environment, and social cohesion. 
50
Under a supporting mode, Europe does not legislate, but rather
promotes and complements, for instance, in the areas of social
policy, education, culture, and consumer protection.1
5
'
The overall approach does seem German. The Germans
were the first to ask for a clearer division of powers to be laid
143. Mazan, supra n.48, at 95-97. But see Larry Cata Backer, The Extra-National State:
American Confederate IederalisMn and the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 173, 225-26
(2001) (diagnosing that this conundrum of German theory in search of sovereignty
"ignores the ftndamental basis of structural ordering within Europe").
144. PDCT, supra n.1, title Ill ("Union Competence and Actions"). See also Chair-
man of Working Group V, Complimentary Competences, Final Report, CONV 375/1/02
at 2 (Nov. 4, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 Working Group VI, Final Report].
145. PDCT, supra n.1, art. 10 ("The article indicates the areas of exclusive Union
competence").
146. Id. art. II ("The article indicates the areas of competence shared between the
Union and the Member States. It establishes the principle that, as and when the Union
takes action in these areas, the Member States may act only within the limits defined by
the Union legislation.").
147. Id. art. 12 ("This provision indicates the areas in which the Union supports or
coordinates action by the Member States, but does not have the competence to legislate.").
148. Id. at 2-3.
149. See also 2002 Working Group V, F"inal Report, supra n.144, at 6-7.
150. Id.
151. See also 2002 Working Group V, Final Report, supra n.144, at 3-5, 8-10. The
Working Group recommends usage of the term "supporting measures." Id. at 1.
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down in a charter of competences, partly because the sixteen
Ldnder feared that European integration was chipping away at
their prerogatives. 5 2 The German Constitution embraces a
model of vertical federalism sporting a catalogue that divides
sovereignty between the federation and the states. 151
The counter-thematic type of action power advanced in the
blueprint is almost surprising. The salient provision states that
in certain areas, the Member States may define and pursue com-
mon policies within the Union framework and according to spe-
cific rules. 15 4 The meaning of this clause has yet to be clarified.
From its wording, it could signal a resurrection of a Member
State margin of maneuver or a silent repatriation of powers.
155
The Germans and the British, for example, advocate that agri-
cultural and regional aid should be re-nationalized, since they
gobble up most of the EU's budget.5 6  Spain and France
strongly oppose such a change.
57
4. Institutional Government
The design and prerogatives of the institutional architec-
ture of Europe exhibit a pronounced tilt toward the executive
branch rooted in the Nation-State.s The Member States are
the masters of the treaties.' 59 They dominate the intergovern-
mental decision processes and summits.'" Within the suprana-
152. See, e.g., ECONOMIST, supra n.130 (presenting the example of bail-outs of local
industry); Volkmann-Schluck, supra n.40, at 40 (offering quotes from Governors Ed-
mund Stoiber of Bavaria and Wolfgang Clement of Northrhine-Westphalia).
153. Under the German Grundgesetz (GG), the states are the presumed repositories
for all legislative activities. However, the federation enters the picture through abso-
lute, concurrent, and framework competences as well as tacitly implied powers. In prac-
tice, most areas, except police, culture, and education, have been overlain by federal
legislation. The states exercise input through the Federal Council. GG, arts. 30, 71-75.
See KARL-HEINZ SEIFERT & DIETER HOMiG, GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIF BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND 220, 331 (1988).
154. PDCT, supra n.], art. 13 ("In certain areas the Member States may define and
pursue common policies, within the Union framework and according to specific rules.
This article indicates these areas").
155. Volkmann-Schluck, supra n.40, at 40-41 (describing players and positions in
the context of renationalization of policy fields).
156. ECONOMIST, supra n.130 (noting that the budget is disproportionately fi-
nanced by Germany).
157. Id.
158. Mazan, supra n.48, at 146-54, 160-64.
159. Ulrich Everling, Zur Stellung der Mitgliedstaaten der Europdischen Union als "Her-
ren der Vrtrge, " in FESTSCfIRIFT FOR RUDOLF BERNHARDT 1161 (1995).
160. Puder, supra n.5, at 57
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tional fold, they enjoy central appointment powers and their del-
egates make up the chief legislator. 6 ' Finally, implementation
of European law is ensured by each Member State.
16 2
In the area of institutional government, the blueprint is no-
tably rough merely throwing out topical headings. 6 3 However,
the reforms relative to the Presidency of the European Coun-
cil, 164 the Presidency of the European Commission,' 65 the Coun-
cil of Ministers, 166 and the Congress of the Peoples of Europe 
167
signal major surgery. While not explicitly stated in the
blueprint, this overhaul will interconnect with the future design
of the European Parliament' 68 and the role of the national par-
liaments. 169
Conceived as a treaty architect and pacemaker, the Euro-
pean Council retains the character of an intergovernmental
body. 17" Although not a Community institution,1 7 1 the Euro-
pean Council has increasingly become the repository for
micromanaging and resolving stalled first pillar issues dead-
locked in the Community's institutional triangle. The trend of
bumping up difficult questions into the European Council has
led to overloaded summit agendas. Issues are frequently
161. Mazan, supra n.48, at 146-155.
162. See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Ein Plddoyerfiir die dezentrale Kontrolle der Anwend-
ung des Gemeinschaftsrechts durch die Mitgliedsstaaten, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR PIERRE PES-
CATORE 205 (1987).
163. PDCT, supra n.1, Title IV ("Union Institutions").
164. Id. art. 15 ("When the Convention has discussed it, this article could establish
the term of office and appointment procedure for the Presidency of the European Council,
its role and responsibilities.").
165. Id. art. 18 ("This article would establish the role and appointment procedure
for the Presidency of the Commission.").
166. Id. art. 17 ("This article lists the composition and the duties of the Council,
and would refer to the Council's formations.").
167. Id. art. 19 ("This article would raise the possibility of establishing a Congress of
the Peoples of Europe, determine its composition and the procedure for appointing its
members, and define its powers."). It would be drafted in the light of the Convention's
work.
168. Id. art. 16, para. I ("This article establishes the composition of the European
Parliament, the members of which are elected by direct universal suffrage."); PDCT,
art. 16, para. 2 ("It lists the powers of the European Parliament introducing a motion of
censure on the activities of the Commission, and the procedure and consequences of
such a motion.").
169. Id. art. 8, para. 3 ("It would set out the rules for effective monitoring of sub-
sidiarity and proportionality. The role of the National Parliaments would be men-
tioned.").
170. Puder, supra n.5, at 57.
171. Id.
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brokered through packaged deals or along shopping lists. This
has given the summit institution de facto prerogatives not fore-
seen by the treaty system. Similar considerations apply to the
increased usage of the open method of coordination under the
aegis of the European Council. 172 Further strengthening the Eu-
ropean Council through scratching the short-breathed rota-
tional system in favor of a multi-annual presidency, as mooted by
Monsieur Giscard, 7 : might be viewed as a recipe for developing
a European executive based on intergovernmentalism.
Those seeking compensation for a strengthened European
Council advocate the creation of a dual or twin presidency by
placing the installation of the President of the European Com-
mission into the hands of the European Parliament. 7" The al-
ternative to this Franco-German parliamentary model envisions a
presidential track based on the direct election of the President
of the European Commission."' The UK opposes both these
proposals since stronger reigns retained by the Nation-States are
favored.'7 However, making the Commission Presidency ac-
countable to the peoples, directly or through a parliamentary
intermediary, promises to strengthen the European Commis-
sion's democratic legitimacy and move the body closer to a Euro-
pean Government.17 7
The creation or approximation of a European Government
could conceivably unleash pressure dynamics and domino into
the rise of a bicameral legislature consisting of a Chamber of
172. See Claus Giering, "Offene Koordinier ing" - Sachstand, Voiziige und Probleme,
CAP-THESENPAPIER 05/2001 (2001).
173. Heuser, supra n.4, at 3 (predicting enhanced leadership primarily in the for-
eign and security policy arena). See also Dominique de Villepin & Joschka Fischer,
Deutsch-Franzsischer Beitrag zum Euroinischen Konvent iber the institutionelle Architektur der
Union, CONTRIB 192, CONV 489/03, at 3 (Jan. 16, 2003) (proposing a five-year term);
Janis A. Emmanouilidis & Claus Giering, Enhancing the Political Leadership in the EU -
How the EU Could Work with Two Presidents, CAP SPici-i r-r 2003/01 2-3 (2003).
174. Villepin & Fischer, supra n. 173, at 4. See also Emmanouilidis & Giering, supra
n.173, at 3 (disfavoring the route of a "double-head" within one person). See also Kom-
mission der Europaischen Gemeinschaften, Ffir die Europdiische Union - Frieden, Freiheit,
Solidaritiat, Mitteiling der Kommission zur Institutionellen Architektur, KOM (2002) 728, at
19 ((2002) (supporting election of the Commission President by the European Parlia-
ment and subsequent confirmation by the European Council).
175. EcONOMIST, supra n.130 (identifying Guy Verhostadt of Belgium as the major
proponent of the presidential model).
176. Id. (at the time also listing France).
177. Puder, suna n.8, at 67-68 (discussing the Government Model that was floated
in connection with the Nice reforms relative to the European Commission).
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States and a Chamber of the Peoples.' 78 A conversion of the
Council of Ministers into the Chamber of States 7" could be
modeled after the U.S. Senate with two directly elected Senators
per state, or the German Bundesrat template with a fixed range
of delegates from the Ldnder.""° A full parliamentarization of
the European Parliament into the Chamber of the Peoples, fur-
ther down the road, would requires relinquishing the weighted
composition and switching to a proportional key in consonance
with the democratic principle of population sizes.
The proposed Congress of the Peoples of Europe, an an-
nual super-assembly of members of the European Parliament
and the national parliaments, would present a new critter in the
institutional grid of the integration framework.' 8 ' A personal
pet-peeve of Monsieur Giscard's,' 12 the added benefits of such a
new institution are unclear, especially if its mandate were con-
fined to merely hosting a debating club.18 : If the European Con-
vention proves successful, it might be more opportune to retain
and formalize it, and raise its stature from mere preparer to doer
when it comes to constitutional revision,"s rather than adding
complexity to the system through the addition of yet another
new body.'8 "
Similar considerations apply to the role of national parlia-
ments."" The current treaty system does not entrust the na-
tional parliaments with a direct institutional role. Yet, they are
central players and a vital conduit in the overall integration pro-
cess, since they represent the linkage between the citizens and
178. Id. at 76 n.221.
179. Villepin & Fischer, supra n. 173, at 5-6; Emmanotilidis & Giering, supra n.173,
at 4. Qualified majority would be the general decision mode prevailing in the Chamber
of States. All its leetings Wul(d be pu!blic. See also Thinking Enlarged Group, Bridging
the Leadership Gap - A Strategy fnr Improving Political Leadership in the EU, at 7
(2002) (advocating that the Member States come together in Steering Councils relative
to fields not (yet) subject to communitized lawmaking).
180. janning & Giering, supra n.33, at 55.
181. Kampfer, supra n. 106.
182. Heuser, supra n.4, at 3.
183. See Kampfer, supra n.106 (reporting reservations held by many members
against this new institution).
184. HettseI, supra n.4, at 3.
185. Id. at 4.
186. See id. (reporting that "the incorporation of the national parliaments in [the
anlal] congress is not perceived to be a great improvement").
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Europe." 7 In many Member States, the parliaments enact the
ratification laws and scrutinize government action. "' In parlia-
mentary systems, they exercise direct political control of the na-
tional governments, and thus indirectly over the delegations to
the Council of Ministers. 8 " In other words, the national parlia-
ments anchor and legitimize the integration framework in the
Members States.' "
Monsieur Giscard's blueprint envisions a role for the na-
tional parliaments within an early warning system designed to
the monitor European legislation relative to the subsidiarity and
proportionality principles.'' This may include a right of appeal
before the European Court of Justice. 192 The proposal thus ig-
nores any attempts at institutional tricameralism through mak-
ing the national parliaments a screening chamber relative to
proposals emerging from the European Commission, or through
transforming the Conference of the Community and European
Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the EU (Conftrence des Or-
ganes Spgcialisgs dans les Affaires Communautaires or "COSAC") into
a full-fledged institution. 9 ' Rather, the trend points to recogniz-
ing the constitutional significance of the national parliaments,
formalizing the convention format,'94 and forging multilateral
networks or mechanisms, 9 ' including interparliamentary con-
ferences and an annual European week.' 9 6
5. Other Emerging Topics
Monsieur Giscard's blueprint offers a reminder to make en-
187. Villepin & Fischer, supra n.173, at 7.
188. See Working Group IV, The Role of National Parliaments, Final Report, CONV
353/02, at 4-9 (Oct. 22, 2002) (speaking of national scrutiny systems).
189. Kampfer, supra n.106. See also LAUFER & FISCHER, supra n.42, at 156 (discuss-
ing the idea to revise Article 203 of the EC Treaty and open the Council of Ministers to
national parliamentarians).
190. Working Group IV, supra n.188, at 2.
191. Id. at 9-12; Chairman of Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity,
CONV 286/02 (Sept. 23, 2002).
192. Id. at 7-9.
193. PDCT Summary, supra n.], at 5 & 14; Working Group IV, supra n.188, at 13-
14. See also LAUFER & FISCHER, supra n.42, at 153 (referring to a French proposal circu-
lated during the Maastricht debate).
194. PDCT Summary, supra n.], at 5.
195. Id. at 5; Working Group IV, supra n.188, at 12-15; Kampfer, supra n.106.
196. Working Group IV, supra n.188, at 15.
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hanced cooperation workable.l"7 The feature itself is not new as
such. In an attempt to overcome the potentially conflicting pres-
sures between deepening and widening the concept of flexible
integration was introduced into the integration system by the
Treaty of Amsterdam and overhauled by the Treaty of Nice.' "
Discussed throughout the 1990s, flexible integration ideally com-
bines the firm commitment by all members to a common supra-
national base with the option of further integration through
open partnerships in other areas. Yet, the many brakes injected
into the feature make flexible integration a rather cumbersome
vehicle.199 It is therefore not surprising that it has never been
invoked thus far. Identifying salient principles governing flexi-
bility mechanisms in a Europe of more than twenty-five mem-
bers, the blueprint recognizes that vanguards or pioneer groups
must be allowed to press forward in particular fields, especially
foreign, security, and defense arrangements, justice and home
affairs, and finance and economic policy.2""
Monsieur Giscard's blueprint offers language declaring that
Europe's budget is fully financed by its own resources.20 1 In con-
trast to the term financial contributions, 2 2 this concept suggests
197. PDCT, supra n.1, art. 32 ("This provision should establish: - the conditions
for undertaking enhanced cooperation within the framework of the Treaty; - if necessary,
areas of the Treaty excluded from enhanced cooperation; - the principle of applying
the relevant provisions of the Treaties in adopting the acts necessary for implementing
enhanced cooperation; - the obligations of states participating in enhanced coopera-
tion, and of those not so participating.").
198. The provisions on closer cooperation now apply to all pillars of the EU. TEU,
supra n.5, arts. 43-45 (general provisions); EC Treaty, supra n.6, art. 11 (first pillar);
TEU, supra n.5, arts. 27(a)-27(e); TEU, supra n.5, arts. 40-40(b) (third pillar). Tile
second pillar also allows for the possibility of a constructive abstention. TEU, supra n.5,
art. 23(1). For an overview of the genesis and content of the provisions, see Xenophon
A. Yataganas, The Treaty of Nice, The Sharing of Power and the Institutional. Balance in the
European Union 46-49 (Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper, Jan. 2001).
199. Joseph Janning, Dynamik in der Zwangsjacke - Fexibilitdt in der Europdischen
Union nach Amsterdam, 4 INrTGRATNON 285 (1997) (using the image of the "dynamic in
the straight jacket"); Francoise de la Serre & Helen Wallace, Flexibility and Enhanced
Cooperation in the European Union: Placebo rather than Panacea? 2 (Groupement Notre Eu-
rope, Research and Policy Paper, 1997) (characterizing the feature as a placebo for
France and Germany); Werner Weidenfeld & Claus Giering, Die Europdische Union nach
Amsterdam - Bilanz und Perspektive, in AMSTERDAM IN DER ANALYSE 82-84 (Werner Wei-
denfeld ed., 1998) (fearing that safeguards may lead the acquis ad absurdum).
200. Weidenfeld, supra n.79, at 3.
201. PDCT, supra n.], art. 38 ("This provision states that the Union budget is fully
financed by own resources and sets out the procedure for establishing the system of own
resources.").
202. See RUDOLF GEIGER, EG-VERTRAG - KOMMENTAR ZU DEM VERTRAG ZUR
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a tax levied directly on economic operators and collected by Eu-
ropean institutions exclusively for Europe's benefit. Yet, under
the present system, these pre-allocated and capped resources211
are levied by the Member States according to their laws and reg-
ulations. "1 q Integrationists envision relinquishing the fund trans-
fers from the Nation-States to finance most of the EU's
budget.115 They argue that a direct European tax, '21  such as a
share of the sales taxes,2117 would make the finances of Europe
more open.2 1 1 1 In the long run that could increase revenues.2Wl
However, it would add another dynamic tax layer and more red
tape that could further dampen the investment appetite of eco-
nomic operators in Europe.
At present, the EU's international stature derives from the
leverage of the Community core and the sovereignty reservoirs
of the Member States. Monsieur Giscard's blueprint recognizes
the need to harmonize the substance of common policies and
the representation on the international stage,2 " especially when
it comes to the EU's embryonic foreign policy. 2 1' In this field
the supranational Commission has been given little influence. t2
The European telephone number is housed with the High Rep-
resentative for Foreign Policy in the Council of Minister's Gen-
GRONoUNG DER EUROP'AISCHlN GEIEM NSI-All 681-82 (1993) (providing the background
information relative to the switch from "financial contributions" to "own resources" ac-
complished by the Maastricht Treaty).
203. Thea Emmerling, Von der Struktpolitik znm enroiischen inanzausgleich? 4
(CAP Working Paper, June 2002) (observing that the budget represents a little more
than 1% of the gross national prodclct Of' the EU, while the government share in the
Member Suates amotlntS to just under 50%).
204. GECEa'R, supra 11.202, at 683.
205. EcONONIST, s1pra n.130.
206. See Henser, sunr n.4, at 4.
207. ElONOMtST, s/lura n.130).
208. Id. See also Emmerling, s10/a n.203, aLt 6-8 (lamenting the absence of a debate
in the Euro lpea n institulions with respect 1o a substitution I Ilthe complex structural and
Cohesion funds with a gelneral financial equalization scheme).
209. LI:ONMIIST, sn/a n. 130.
210. PDCT, slna n.1, art. 41, pala. I ("This 1 provisio n should set (011 who repre-
sents the Union in intern alional relations, taking into accont of' competences already
exercised by the Commnnity."); id. art. 41, para. 2 ("In the light of the Convention's
future work, it would define the role and flture rLank of the High Representative for
Common Foreign and Security Policy.").
211. See Janis Emnmanouilidies & Franco Algeri, Strengthening Foreign I'olicy Coherence
and the Capacity to Act, CAP Spotlight 20)2/02 1 (21(12) (calling the split "anachronis-
tic").
212. Puder, supra n.5, at 57.
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eral Secretariat. In addition to preserving and synergizing the
status quo, 21 3 the basic options in this context include creating
the new post of European Minister of Foreign Affairs under the
direct authority of the President of the European Council,2 14
moving the High Representative into a Commission Vice Presi-
dency for Foreign Relations,215 or combining both offices in one
person or double-head with the new title of European External
Representative.21 "
The events in America have exposed a strengthening air of
intergovernmentalism in the EU process. For example, the re-
cently established Eurojust agency, tasked with facilitating cross-
border criminal investigations, has been housed in the Third Pil-
lar. 217 Similarly, the diversity of the constitutional and political
situations in the Member States have fragmented individual pos-
tures and caused the proliferation of special arrangements
among Member States and with third countries, thus increas-
ingly posing roadblocks with respect to the rise of a common
policy and capability in the security and defense arena.1 !
Although a full-fledged withdrawal has never occurred in
the fifty-year history of European integration,2"'" Monsieur Gis-
card's blueprint advances the insertion of a unilateral termina-
213. Working Group VII, External Action, Final Report, CONV 459/02, at 19 (Dec.
16, 2002).
214. Id. at 22.
215. Id. at 20. See also The Economist, supra n.13) (identifying this option as the
approach favored by Germany, but met with reluctance by France and the United King-
dom).
216. ECONOMIsr, supra n. 130; Emmanouilidies & Algeri, supra n.21 1, at 2. But see
Thinking Enlarged Group, supra n.179, at 5 (explaining that the single-face approach
would upset the equilibrium between the institutions and curtail the autonomy of the
European Commission).
217. See Chairman of Working Group X, Freedom, Security and Justice, Final Report,
CONV 426/02, at 15 (Dec. 2, 2002).
218. See Chairman of Working Group VIII, Defence, Final Report, CONV 461/02
(Dec. 16, 2002). See also Emmanonilidies & Algeri, supra n.211 (recommending, inter
alia, to (1) overcome the pillar structure; (2) strengthen the Commission; (3) merge
the High Representative and External Relations Commissioner; (4) move the common
foreign and security policy from the General Council to a separate function; (5) intro-
cluce ma'ority voting in non-military questions; (6) integrate the European Parliament
into all non-military aspects; (7) reform the decisionmaking and coordination proce-
dures in the military domain; and (8) forge an overall foreign policy strategy).
219. In he mid-1980s, Greenland, although remaining a part of the Danish state
territory, was released from the scope of applicability of the EC Treaty. See EC Treaty,
supra n.6 art. 188. See also GIGER, sup1ra n.202, at 486.
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tion clause.22 In light of the unlimited duration of the treaties,
the conspicuous absence of withdrawal provisions, the control
voluntarily relinquished by each Member States over certain ar-
eas, the elastic balancing valves of general escape clauses, mini-
derogation schemes, and phase-in regimes sprinkled throughout
the integration system, the autonomists2 21 have argued that with-
drawal, even through actus contrarius, would amount to a consti-
tutional breach.212 The traditionalists22 ' advocate that, in the ab-
sence of a treaty-immanent regime, the general rules of public
international law should be applied.22 4 Short of a joint treaty
termination by all Member States, 225 it is argued that unilateral
withdrawal requires a basic change of the underlying circum-
stances (clausula rebus sic stantibus)226 In terms of constitutional-
ization, the insertion of a withdrawal clause would seem counter-
productive to the eternity of a solemn foundational docu-
ment.227 Interestingly, voluntary withdrawal is not matched in
Monsieur Giscard's blueprint by a corresponding expulsion
clause.
Finally, Monsieur Giscard's blueprint recognizes the signifi-
cance of the amendment power within a federal system of checks
and balances. 22' At present, constitutional revision is exclusively
controlled by the Member States in unison. A constitutionalized
revision process may involve lowering the threshold and inject-
ing an emancipated democratic parliamentary component. 229
V. Findings and Perspectives
The tour de force of constitutionalizing themes tackled in
Monsieur Giscard's blueprint indicates that it is not easy to write
220. PDCT, supra n. 1, art. 46 ("The article would mention the possibility of estab-
lishing a procedure for voluntary withdrawal from the Union by decision of a Member
State, and the institutional consequences of such a withdrawal").
221. MICHAEL SCHWEITZER & WALDEMAR HUMMER, EUROPARECHT 207 (1993).
222. GEIGER, supra n.202, at 780-81.
223. SCHWEITZER & HUMMER, supra n.221, at 207.
224. GEIGER, supra n.202, at 781.
225. Id. at 781.
226. Id. at 782. See also BVerfGE 89, 255, 290, 305 ("ultima ratio").
227. See Heuser, supra n.4, at 4-5 (admonishing caution relative to the insertion of
a withdrawal provision, since singular States might instrumentalize the new tool).
228. PDCT, supra n.1, art. X ("Procedure for revision of the constitutional treaty").
229. See Backer, supra n.143, at 190 (describing that amendments to the U.S. Con-
stitution require large concurrent majorities within the general government-two-
thirds of both houses of Congress, and the states-three-quarters).
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a European Constitution, even when heeding the advice to take
only the respectively best from the national constitutions of the
Member States.23 In basic terms, modern constitutions marry a
set of rules for the institutional organization of governance and
a catalogue of fundamental rights.231  Measured against this
linkage, Monsieur Giscard's blueprint is promising. The innova-
tive body has been said to invoke the spirit of the Philadelphia
Convention.232 Independent of solemn comparisons, the suc-
cess of the European Convention's search in the dark for the
political truth will be determined by the character of the final
proposal.23 3  On this path, the European Convention is actively
putting meat on the bones of the skeleton. 234 The method of
incrementally completing building blocks is yielding steady pro-
gresss 23 and a final document, rather than a mere batch of op-
tions, in sight.
Traditionally, however, the concept of a constitution has
been associated with the rise of the democratic Nation-State. 236
230. Martin Kremer, Europiische Verfassungsdiskussion - Anregungen aus den nation-
alen verfassungsrechtlichen Vorversttindnissen der Mitgliedsstaaten, available at http://welt
politik.net (attributing this bon mot to Carlo Schmid).
231. Di Fabio, supra n.101, at 162. The author argues that the European Charter
of Fundamental Rights laid "a first foundation for the political constitution of Europe."
Id. at 159. See also Grimm, supra n.52, at 284 (offering that a Constitution for Europe
denotes "a basic legal order of the sort that arose at the end of the 18th century in the
wake of two successful revolutions in America and in France, which has since steadily
spread and now come to apply almost world-wide").
232. Kfthnhardt, supra n.125, at 38; Thomas KAR, Das Vorbild heisst Philadelphia,
Financial Times Deutschland (Mar. 28, 2002).
233. Leader, Give Giscard a Chance - His EU Plan is Better than Our Leaders Say,
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, available at http://www.guradian.co.uk/eu/story/0,7369,821179,
00.html.
234. See The European Convention, Articles and Protocols, available at http://euro-
pean-convention.et.int/ArticlesTraites.asp?lang=en. For the vast array of alternatives
already offered with respect to the draft articles, see Proposed Amendments to the Text
of the Articles of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, available at http://
etropean-convention.eu.int/amendemTrait.asp?lang=en.
235. See Heuser, supra n.4, at I (summarizing that Monsieur's Giscard's blueprint
(1) provides for procedural target orientation; (2) integrates points of consensus; (3)
contains important suggestions for reforms; (4) provides structure; and (5) leaves open
decisions with respect to intractable matters); Shaw, supra n.58, at 10- 15 (finding, albeit
caveated, that the European Convention meets the criteria of being autonomous, repre-
sentative, deliberative, receptive, and decisional).
236. The European Court ofJustice seems to subscribe to the avant-garde posture
that Europe has a constitution and does not need one. European integration under
this reasoning stems from a steady constitutionalization process driven in particular by
jurisprudence.
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The tatiste school of thought advances the formula "where no
{S]tate, no constitution, and where no population, no
[S]tate. ''3 7  Intermediary approaches recognize that the Com-
munity core wields State-like powers23 8 and offer the magic elix-
irs of post-national or multi-level constitutionalism ,2"9 neoconsti-
tutionalism,24 or cosmopolitanism. 4' Since organisms of gov-
ernance beyond the local circles retain a sense of high
abstraction, it is argued, the sentiments connecting the citizens
and societies in Europe do not necessarily have to be confined to
the framework of a State-like entity; rather, these loyalties can
conceivably arise over time relative to a State-transcending
clearinghouse. Moreover, these voices offer a European notion
of demos construed through multi-level prisms2 4 2 and dynamic so-
cietal interaction.243
Even in light of a departure from the State template as such,
serious challenges exist when it comes to achieving the expres-
sion of the collective democratic self-determination of the peo-
ples in Europe. A lingua franca does not exist. 24 a Similarly, en-
ticing a public at large for the construction of the European
237. Paul Kirchof, Konpetenzaufteilung zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten under der EU, in
VERTRETUNG DER EUROPAISCIIEN KOMMISSION IN DIER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
(ED): EUROPAISCHE GESPRACIIE 2/94: DiE KUNFI'I(;E VIERFASSUNGSORDNUN; DER EU -
EINE DOKUMENTATION at 59 (1994).
238. Grimm, surta n.52, at 288.
239. Ulrike Gufrot, The Constitutionalization af Europe and Its Inmpact n the United
States, available at h ttp:// wv.aicgs.org/Cu/Llg/shtml.
240. Mark Killian Brewer, The European Union and Legitiinacy: Tine ]oi a European
Constitution, 34 CORNELL INT't. L.J. 555, 560-574 (2001) (identifying three basic assump-
tions relative to neoconstitutionalism: (I) traditional international law terms do not
capture the notion; (2) the EU suffers from structural deficiencies; and (3) the EU has
no demos).
241. Pavlos Eleftheriadis, The European Constitution and Cosmopolitan Ideals, 7
Cot UM. J. EUR. L. 21, 39 (2001) (concluding that "the cosmopolitan suggestion
achieves the elusive balance between the requiremenrLs of democracy and the pressures
of integration.").
242. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Deinos, Telos and the
German Maastricht Decision, I EUR. L.J. 219 (1995) (arguing for a European notion of
membership where individuals belong to multiple demoi defined in different ways).
243. jOrgen Habermas, Remarks on Dieter Grimm s 'Does Europe Need a Constitution?', I
EUR. L.J. 303, 306 (1995) ("The ethical-political self-understanding of citizens in a dem-
ocratic community must not be taken as an historical a priori that makes democratic
will-formation possible, but rather as the flowing contents of a circulatory process that is
generated through the legal institutionalization of citizens' communication").
244. For a key role of language, see, for example, Grimm, supra n.52, at 295.
Jfirgen Habermas, Faktizit5t und Geltung 372 (1992) (diagnosing that ultimately it is
the 'linguistic bond' that keeps any communicative community together).
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house has thus far proven a sluggish process at best. Despite the
trumpets and fanfares associated with the European Convention,
64% of the citizens have never heard of he European Conven-
tion. And more tellingly, only 25% have expressed faith in its
proceedings.245 It is in this context that the convention process
must gather steam and become a catalytic lever.2 46 The Euro-
pean Convention's Hamiltons, Jays, and Madisons must step for-
ward and publish powerful intellectual prose of import compara-
ble to the Federalist Papers. 4 7 More importantly, Monsieur Gis-
card and his colleagues may consider formalizing the convention
template as the final constitution giver and push for a Europe-
wide referendum on their final document, thus creating a Euro-
pean public space. 4 s
Viewed in the light of its substantive and procedural
promises, regardless of the ever-elusive finalitg finale, Monsieur
Giscard's sketch composition does not contain too many notes.
As we said initially, noblesse oblige: allons-y, VGE!
245. See Civil Society and the Convention - Enhancing Public Awareness, CAP Spotlight
2002/06 (2002) (presenting summer 2002 survey results, and recommending organized
civil society as a link between the European Convention and the citizens). But see
Guerot, supra n.80, at 2 (reporting 16,000 daily entries submitted through the mailbox
under the menu juturum of the EU's web-based Europa portal).
246. Gui6rot, supra n.58, at 5 (describing Monsieur Giscard's sense of a convention
spirit that must reflect the Greek "En-thousiasinus" - inspired by God).
247. Kfthnhardt, supra n.125, at 38.
248. Gu6rot, supra n.58,, at 10 (emphasizing one person/one vote); A Constitution
for the European Union, EcoNoMIsT, Oct. 28, 2000, at 22 ("We, the people of Europe
.. 1)
